

DECIDABLE MODELS<sup>†</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

A model  $\mathfrak{A}$  is decidable if  $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{A}, a)_{a \in A}$  is recursive. Various results about decidable models are discussed. A necessary and sufficient condition for there to be a decidable saturated model is given.

## 1. Preliminaries

Capital German letters  $\mathfrak{A}$ ,  $\mathfrak{B}$ ,  $\mathfrak{C}$  will denote relation structures with universe  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $C$  respectively. In this paper they will always have a countable universe and a countable number of relations. Further we shall always assume there is an effective enumeration of the universe and a fixed Gödel numbering of the formulas in the associated first order language.

A structure  $\mathfrak{A}$  is *decidable* if  $\text{Th}(\mathfrak{A}, a)_{a \in A}$  is recursive, that is, if the set of pairs of formulas  $\varphi$  and finite sequences  $\bar{a}$  from  $A$ ,  $\{(\varphi, \bar{a}); \mathfrak{A} \models \varphi[\bar{a}]\}$ , is recursive. This is stronger than only requiring the relations to be recursive. For example,  $\langle \omega, +, \times \rangle$  has recursive relations but it is not decidable. In some papers (e.g. [4]) these are distinguished as *constructive* and *strongly constructive*. Speaking more loosely we shall say  $\mathfrak{A}$  is decidable if  $\mathfrak{A}$  is isomorphic to a decidable structure.

If  $\bar{a}$  is a finite sequence in  $A$  then the *type* of  $\bar{a}$  is the set of formulas satisfied by  $\bar{a}$  in  $\mathfrak{A}$ . The type is recursive if the set of Gödel numbers of the formulas is recursive. A *list* of recursive types is a set of r.e. indices for the types.

2. The most important fact about decidable structures is the following well known result.

**THEOREM 2.1.** *A decidable theory has a decidable model.*

The proof consists of noting that for decidable theories the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem is effective. Since most of the results of this paper are

<sup>†</sup> Dedicated to the memory of Abraham Robinson

proved by variants of the Henkin construction we shall give a more explicit description of it.

Given a consistent theory  $T$  in a countable first order language, we enlarge the language by adding new individual constants  $c_n (n \in \omega)$ . An enumeration  $\sigma_m (m \in \omega)$  of the sentences in the enlarged language is chosen such that  $c_n$  does not occur in  $\sigma_m$  for  $m \leq n$ . The theory  $T$  is enlarged inductively as follows:

i) at stage  $2n$  either  $\sigma_n$  or  $\neg \sigma_n$  is added so as to be consistent with  $T$  and the sentences previously added.

ii) if the sentence added at stage  $2n$  has the form  $\exists x \varphi(x)$  then  $\varphi(c_n)$  is added at stage  $2n + 1$ .

As is well known this defines a complete theory in the enlarged language and a model of  $T$  with universe  $\{c_n; n \in \omega\}$ .

If  $T$  is decidable the preceding may be done effectively and hence:

**THEOREM 2.2.**  *$T$  has a decidable model if and only if  $T$  has a decidable extension if and only if  $T$  has a decidable completion.*

### 3. Omitting types

Throughout this section we will assume  $T$  is a complete decidable theory.

By a variant of the Henkin construction one may construct models of  $T$  omitting any non-principal type (i.e., one not generated by a single formula) of finite sequence. (See, for example, [5].) By noting that this construction can be made effective, we have:

**THEOREM 3.1.** *i) For any non-principal type there is a decidable model of  $T$  omitting it.*

*ii) For any recursive list of recursive non-principal types there is a decidable model of  $T$  omitting all of them.*

Note in i) that if the non-principal type is not recursive then it follows directly from Theorem 2.1 since no decidable model can have a non-recursive type.

The following strengthening of 3.1 appears in Millar [3].

**THEOREM 3.2.** *For every  $\Sigma_2^0$  list of non-principal type there is a decidable model of  $T$  omitting all of them.*

One expects that the decidable models of  $T$  would be among the simpler ones.

Leo Harrington [2] considered the prime model and showed:

**THEOREM 3.3.** *Suppose  $T$  has a prime model. A necessary and sufficient condition that it be decidable is that there be a recursive list of the principal types.*

The necessity is obvious but the other direction requires a priority argument. Harrington also showed by example that there is:

- i) a decidable theory  $T$  with a prime model which is not decidable, and
- ii) a decidable prime model which has no recursive list of the generators of the principal types.

Finally we have:

**THEOREM 3.4.** *If  $T$  does not have a decidable prime model then  $T$  has an infinite number of non-isomorphic decidable models.*

Note that we do not assume  $T$  has any prime model.

**PROOF.** By Theorem 2.1  $T$  has a decidable model  $\mathfrak{A}_0$ . If  $\mathfrak{A}_0$  is not prime it realizes some non-principal type  $p_0$ . By Theorem 3.1 there is a decidable  $\mathfrak{A}_1$  omitting  $p_0$ . If  $\mathfrak{A}_1$  is not prime it realizes a non-principal type  $p_1$ . There is then a decidable  $\mathfrak{A}_2$  omitting  $p_0$  and  $p_1$ . Proceeding inductively we get an infinite sequence of decidable models.

#### 4. Theories with few models

Throughout this section  $T$  is a complete decidable theory.

If  $T$  is  $\aleph_0$ -categorical then by Theorem 2.1 its unique countable model is decidable.

Harrington [2] proves that:

**THEOREM 4.2.** *If  $T$  is  $\aleph_1$ -categorical then all of its countable models are decidable.*

The following question was first raised by A. Nerode.

If  $T$  has only a finite number of countable models, are they all decidable?

Notice that by Theorem 3.4 the prime model will be decidable.

I answered this question by giving an example of a theory with six countable models of which only the prime one was decidable. Later, Peretyat'kin [4] gave an example of a theory with three models of which only the prime one was decidable. By a theorem of Vaught [5] no complete theory has exactly two countable models. The following example of the six model case is due to Lachlan.

**EXAMPLE.** We use the following result of recursion theory. There is a recursive ordering,  $L$ , of the natural numbers which has order type  $\omega + \omega^*$  but

such that the set  $\{n; \text{there are only a finite number of } m \text{ with } mLn\}$  is not recursive.

The theory  $T$  involves two binary relations  $E$  and  $<$  and the axioms say:

- i)  $E$  is an equivalence relation,
- ii) for each  $0 < n < \omega$  there is exactly one equivalence class, say  $c_n$ , with exactly  $n$  elements,
- iii) the equivalence classes are linearly ordered by  $<$  and have order type  $\eta$  (the rationals),
- iv)  $c_n < c_m$  whenever  $nLm$ .

The isomorphism type of a countable model is determined by the order type of those equivalence classes with an infinite number of  $c_n$ 's both above and below them. There are six possibilities:  $1$ ,  $\eta$ ,  $\eta + 1$ ,  $1 + \eta$ ,  $1 + \eta + 1$ , and  $\emptyset$ . Only the last of these has a decidable model for otherwise one could recursively determine the first half of the ordering  $L$ .

In the above example and in the one due to Peretyat'kin the reason not all countable models are decidable is that there are non-recursive types. In the next section we consider the effect of assuming all types recursive.

5. Consider the following four assumptions about a complete theory  $T$ :

- i)  $T$  is decidable.
- ii) Every type of finite sequence consistent with  $T$  is recursive.
- iii) There is a recursive list of the types consistent with  $T$ .
- iv) There is a decidable model realizing all types consistent with  $T$ .

It is clear that iv) implies iii) implies ii) implies i). The example in the last section is a theory satisfying i) but not ii). We shall next give an example of a theory satisfying ii) but not iii). To do this we shall use the following fact of recursion theory.

There is a closed set  $Q \subseteq 2^\omega$  such that 1) the set of non-empty neighborhoods is recursive, 2) every point  $p \in Q$  is recursive, but 3) there is no recursive list of the points in  $Q$ .

The theory  $T$  is now a monadic theory with monadic relations  $R_n$  ( $n \in \omega$ ) such that the consistent 1 types correspond to  $Q$ .

In the next section we shall show that iii) implies iv).

## 6. Saturated models

The main theory of this paper is

**THEOREM 6.1.** *If there is a recursive list of all the finite types consistent with  $T$  then  $T$  has a decidable saturated model.*

Note that the converse to the theorem is trivial.

PROOF. Assume  $L$  is the recursive list of types. There is no loss of generality in assuming each type appears infinitely often. The proof is a modification of the Henkin construction involving a priority argument. So let  $c_n$  and  $\sigma_n$  ( $n \in \omega$ ) be as in Section 2. We shall define (by induction on  $t$ ) sentences  $\theta(t)$  where  $\theta(0)$  is a tautology,  $\theta(2n+1) = \theta(2n+2)$  and  $\theta(2n+1)$  is either  $\theta(2n) \wedge \sigma(n)$  or  $\theta(2n) \wedge \neg \sigma(n)$ .

Let  $n = \langle J(n), K(n) \rangle$  be some standard enumeration of pairs of natural numbers.

Auxiliary to our definition of  $\theta$ , we shall define, by induction on  $t$ , functions  $f(n, t)$ ,  $g(n, t)$ ,  $X(n, t)$  and  $R(n, t)$ . These functions will have "undefined" among their possible values and we shall say " $f(n)$  is undefined at time  $t$ " to mean  $f(n, t) = \text{undefined}$ .

At time  $t$ ,  $f(n)$  will be defined on some finite initial segment of  $\omega$ ,  $g(n)$  on an initial segment of length one longer. The values of  $X$  at time  $t$  depend on those of  $f$  and  $g$  as follows:

$$X(n) = \langle c_0, \dots, c_{m-1}, c_{f(0)}, \dots, c_{t(n-1)} \rangle$$

where  $m = \max\{J(n'); n' < n\}$ .

Note that  $X(n)$  is defined when  $g(n)$  is and its length is independent of  $t$ . The values of  $R$  are requirements on  $\theta$  thus:

$$R(2n) = \theta \text{ is consistent with } X(n) \text{ having type } L(g(n)),$$

$$R(2n+1) \equiv \text{either } \theta \text{ is consistent with } \langle c_0, \dots, c_{J(n)-1}, c_{f(n)} \rangle \text{ having type } L(K(n)) \text{ or } \theta \text{ implies that for no } x \text{ does } \langle c_0, \dots, c_{J(n)-1}, x \rangle \text{ have type } L(K(n)).$$

Notice that  $R(2n)$  and  $R(2n+1)$  are defined when  $g(n)$  and  $f(n)$  respectively are defined.

The inductive definitions of  $\theta(t)$  of  $f(n, t)$  and  $g(n, t)$  are as follows.

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 t = 0 & f(n) \text{ undefined for all } n \\
 & L(g(0)) \text{ an index for } T \\
 & g(n) \text{ undefined for } n \neq 0 \\
 & \theta(0) \text{ a tautology}
 \end{array}$$

$$t = 2n + 2 \quad \theta(t) = \theta(t - 1)$$

Let  $n_0 = \text{least } n \text{ with } f(n, t - 1) \text{ undefined}$   $f(n, t) = f(n, t - 1) \quad n \neq n_0$   $f(n_0, t) = \text{least } r \text{ such that } c, \text{ does not occur in } \theta(t) \text{ and for all } m \text{ and all } t' < t, f(m, t') \neq r,$

$$g(n, t) = g(n, t - 1) \quad n \neq n_0 + 1.$$

For  $n = n_0 + 1$  there are two cases:

Case A)  $f(n_0, t') = \text{undefined for all } t' < t$  then  $g(n_0 + 1, t) = \text{least } r \text{ such that } \theta(t) \text{ satisfies } R(2n).$

Case B) otherwise. Let  $s_0 = \text{last preceding value of } f(n_0)$  and  $t_0 = \text{least } t' \text{ with } f(n_0, t') = s_0.$  Then  $g(n_0 + 1, t) = \text{least } r > g(n_0 + 1, t_0) \text{ such that } \theta(t) \text{ satisfies } R(2n).$

$$t = 2n + 1$$

For each  $m$  if one assumes that  $\theta(t - 1)$  satisfies  $R(m, t - 1)$  then it is possible to choose  $\sigma_n$  or  $\neg\sigma_n$  so that  $\theta(t)$  satisfies  $R(m, t - 1)$ . (Undefined requirements are assumed satisfied.) However, different  $m$ 's may require different choices. Choose  $\theta(t)$  to satisfy longest possible initial segment.

Case I. All requirement satisfied.  $f(m, t) = f(m, t - 1)$  and  $g(m, t) = g(m, t - 1)$  for all  $m$ .

Case II. First requirement violated is  $R(2m + 1)$ . Then  $f(m', t) = f(m', t - 1)$  for  $m' < m$  and  $f(m', t) = \text{undefined for } m' \geq m,$   $g(m', t) = g(m', t - 1)$  for  $m' \leq m$  and  $g(m', t) = \text{undefined for } m' > m.$

Case III. First requirement violated is  $R(2m)$ . Increase value of  $g(m)$  until  $R(2m)$  satisfied. Continue until reach Case I or II.

It will be left to the reader to verify that:

- 1) Since  $L$  is a recursive list the above inductions define recursive functions.
- 2) For each  $n$  there is a  $t_n$  such that  $f(n)$  and  $g(n)$  are defined and independent of  $t$  for all  $t > t_n$ .
- 3) Hence by the requirements  $R(2n) \{ \theta(t); t \in \omega \}$  defines the complete diagram of a saturated model.

**COROLLARY 6.2.** *If every finite type consistent with  $T$  is recursive and the countable saturated model is not decidable then there are an infinite number of non-isomorphic decidable models of  $T$ .*

**PROOF.** Every recursive type is realized in some decidable model. If there were a finite number of decidable models realizing them all then there would be a recursive list of all the types.

## 7. Other results and questions

Vaught [5] shows that no complete theory has exactly two countable models. Millar [3] gives an example to show

**THEOREM 7.1.** *There is a complete theory with exactly two decidable models.*

A natural question is to find conditions under which Vaught's result applies to decidable models. One such is:

**THEOREM 7.2.** *Suppose  $T$  is complete, not  $\aleph_0$ -categorical and every type consistent with  $T$  is recursive. Then  $T$  has at least three non-isomorphic decidable models.*

**PROOF.** By Theorems 3.4 and 6.2 if  $T$  has only a finite number of decidable models then both the prime and saturated models are decidable. Now, imitating Vaught's argument we can construct a model realizing a non-principal type but omitting some non-principal extension of that type.

This leads to a modification of Nerode's question.

**QUESTION.** Suppose  $T$  has exactly  $n < \omega$  countable models and every type consistent with  $T$  is recursive.

- 1) Is every countable model of  $T$  decidable?
- 2) If not, what is the least  $n$  giving a counterexample?

Notice that by 7.2 the answer to 2) is not three.

Another question is whether the results for prime and saturated models can be extended to homogeneous models in general.

**QUESTION.** Suppose there is a recursive list of the types appearing in a countable homogeneous model. Is the model necessarily decidable?

Millar [3] shows that

**THEOREM 7.3.** *Suppose  $\mathfrak{A}$  is a countable homogeneous model,  $L_1$  a  $\Sigma_2^0$  list of the types appearing in  $\mathfrak{A}$  and  $L_2$  a  $\Sigma_2^0$  list of those recursive types omitted in  $\mathfrak{A}$ . Then  $\mathfrak{A}$  is decidable.*

Notice that even for the saturated model this strengthens our Theorem 6.1.

One final counterexample.

**THEOREM 7.4.** *There is a decidable  $T$  with a recursive list of the recursive types consistent with  $T$  but no decidable model of  $T$  is recursively saturated in the sense of Barwise and Schipf [1].*

## REFERENCES

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